



Erasmus+

Enriching lives, opening minds.



**MIGRANTS &
REFUGEES**

in Media and Reality



Erasmus + KA2 Strategic Partnership project

Migrants and refugees in media and reality

2019-3-DK01-KA205-074715

E-HANDBOOK



Intro

The EU-funded project “Migrants and refugees in media and real life” has run over the course of 18 months and has been implemented by partners from Denmark, Estonia, France, and The Netherlands. Today, communication technologies occupy a pivotal role in the narratives that especially young people are exposed through the usage of the internet. As communication technologies shape what kind of narratives are disseminated and promulgated, radical and nationalist groupings throughout Europe have become increasingly savvy in exploiting the digital space as one where they can reproduce their classical distinction between in and out groups to ultimately justify the marginalization of the out group.

In contemporary European societies, this out groups are predominantly constituted by individuals and communities from migrant, refugee, and especially Muslim backgrounds. The intersection between communication technologies, new media, and anti-minority narratives has subsequently created a novel and changing phenomenon contemporary European societies

have to address. Crucially, the use of new media for the promotion of such narratives highlights the need to develop new media literacy skills to respond to these changing trends and changing platforms. For this end, this project has developed an E-handbook of best practices that examines political trends in partaking countries and proposes methods to improve the media literacy skills of youth workers and young people.

The E-handbook includes reports on how Danish, Estonian, French, and Dutch society have responded to the growing presence and visibility of (non-Western) migrants and refugees in their midst, with responses often being shaped by distrust and anxieties of cultural erosion. The overlap in these reactions highlights the shared political trends observable throughout Europe. The videos and activities of the handbook are aimed to facilitate reflection on the presuppositions of the participants and encourage them to empathize with the perceptions of migrants and refugees. The E-handbook is available online to maximize the outreach of this project’s findings.



Description:

Dutch Media Portrayals of Immigrants and Refugees in the 21st Century

The Netherlands is a culturally diverse country that looks back onto a long history of being both a destination for migrants and refugees as well as a country from which people have historically migrated. Comparable to other Northern and Western European states, the Netherlands has registered a large influx of immigrants and refugees since the end of World War II, owing to the decolonization of former Dutch territories, especially in the Caribbean, South America and Indonesia, as well as labor demands that have resulted in work-related migration from Morocco and Turkey. As such, migrants and individuals of migrant or refugee descent are highly present in Dutch society and have started to shape modern Dutch culture. In an attempt to attract highly-skilled migrants and students, the Dutch government has also internationalized significant parts of its education system. Especially for lesser-skilled or unskilled migrants and refugees, however, structural disadvantages vis-a-vis the remainder of Dutch society prevail: a 2010 OECD report observed that “Immigrants with low levels of education are at a severe disadvantage in the Dutch labour market compared to their native

peers – and this gap is far more pronounced than in the OECD on average”. The societal impact of non-white and non-Christian people has also involved contestations and controversies: on the one hand, The Netherlands has been criticized for its ‘Zwarte Piet’ tradition, which has traditionally involved the practice of blackfacing. At the same time Islamophobic sentiment has been rising in the country, inter alia due to the global impact of 9/11, the 2002 killing of anti-immigration politician Pim Fortuyn and the 2004 murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-born Muslim of Moroccan origin (van Selm, 2019). Again comparable to other surging right-wing sentiments throughout Europe, right-wing populist parties such as the VVD and the FvD have been growing in popularity.



As in any other system, media portrayals play an important role in shaping under what terms and in which ways both immigrants and refugees are conceptualized: media framings can help to modify and reinforce both negative and positive notions associated to immigration and asylum (Farris & Mohamed, 2018). As voting behavior is informed by perceptions, media thus matters in how migrants and refugees are socially constructed. *What, then, is the portrayal of immigrants/refugees in the Dutch media?*

Media Portrayals

In line with The Netherlands' existence as a society that incorporates a variety of political opinions and perspectives, the media portrayals of immigrants vary as well. A 2018 report by the International Organization for Migration notes that reports in The Netherlands frequently employ a humanitarian frame that “portrays immigrants as victims of an unfair system,” a portrayal that is often in contrast to more negative localized opinions concerning immigration and the asylum system. The same report contends that media coverage on both parts of the political spectrum shapes the discourse of political parties as parties are more likely to refer to media outlets and publications that fit their narrative as “the right framing helps the party attain its policy goals”. As such, the differing portrayal of immigration pivotally connects to the affiliation individuals feel to certain political parties. This affiliation ultimately informs voting behavior and hence the policy options that are (de)legitimized via the democratic process.

Akin to similar discourses in countries like the UK and the US, immigration has increasingly been understood in connection with criminal activity. As is evidenced by a 2017 paper by Brouwer



Front page reading „Asylum Hopper Invasion“ of De Telegraaf on January 7, 2017

et al., The Netherlands embody a specific European case in the scholarly discourse connected to crimmigration, referring to the convergence of criminal law and immigration law and the growing criminalization of migration policies. The Netherlands, Brouwer et al. (2017) contend, has obtained a “pioneering role in the adoption of restrictive migrant policies and the strong anti-migration sentiment surrounding these policies”. Indeed, the Dutch administration of Prime Minister Mark Rutte has been hesitant if not outright opposed to accepting more migrants (besides students and well-educated workers) and refugees, especially following the outbreak

of the Arab Spring (Migration Policy Institute, 2018). This governmental approach and the public support for such an approach, exhibited by the continued electoral support for Rutte and his party as well as the growing anti-immigrant sentiment in the country, illustrates public skepticism towards what is seen as unregulated and often imperiling migration movements that have swept through Europe. Brouwer et al. (2017) also echo the findings of the IOM report, highlighting that the portrayals of immigrants under the context of criminal activity differ significantly between the rather left-wing newspaper *De Volkskrant* and the relatively right-wing *De Telegraaf*.



Campaigners for the preservation of Zwarte Piet with a banner 'our heritage, save Zwarte Piet' during the arrival of Sinterklaas in Leiden 2017



They conclude that Dutch newspaper portrayals on unauthorized migrants chiefly focus on issues of crime, with the presumed crime-immigration nexus having emerged as the discourse’s “most salient theme”. This discourse and public opinion hereby appear to be mutually reinforcing in shaping a narrative that is skeptical at best regarding the benefits of immigration.

Beyond presumed connections to criminal behavior, Dutch discourse on immigration is pivotally shaped by what ‘kind’ of immigrant is being considered, with an anti-Muslim dimension of this discourse growing stronger in recent years. This is not a necessarily novel trend: incidents

such as the killings of Fortuyn and van Gogh were understood as attacks against the liberalism inherent to Dutch culture and as pointed challenges to the concept of free speech. This narrative is further validated in the public eye by events elsewhere, i.e. in regards to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in France. Portrayals are hereby informed by larger and often extra-national trends and align with the anti-Muslim sentiment growing stronger elsewhere as well: immigrants of Jewish heritage, for instance, receive a more positive form of media coverage than Muslims (Jacobs et al., 2017). This is echoed by Roggebrand and Vliegenthart (2007), who aver that

Islam has emerged as the central theme of immigration discourse to an extent in which immigration is now inextricably portrayed through the frame of Islam. As ‘Muslim’ and ‘immigrant’ are increasingly conflated and both are negatively connotated, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiments in the country have been legitimized.

“Hopeless asylum plague continues unhindered” in De Telegraaf, 7 January 2017



In this context, the notions of ‘immigrant’ and ‘refugee’ are increasingly conflated as well, resulting in growing opposition to both groups.

zaterdag 21 januari 2017

WIERDEN 13

► **Vrijwilliger Voorleesexpress helpt asielzoekers weg te vinden in Wierden**

Bewondering voor kracht van gezin dat uit Syrië vluchtte

Paulien Hogenkamp en Aifalin en Hassan Talib hebben een heel bijzondere band. „Na alles wat zij hebben meegemaakt, is de kracht van dit gezin heel groot.”

Julia Bokdam
Wierden

Aifalin Talib vluchtte twee jaar geleden uit Syrië vanwege de oorlog. Inmiddels woont zij met haar man Hassan en de kinderen Fatima (10) en Louai (5) in Wierden. Ze proberen hier een nieuw bestaan op te bouwen.

„Niemand verlaat zomaar haar geboorteland”, vertelt Aifalin. Zij kon de veiligheid voor zichzelf en haar gezin niet meer garanderen in haar woonplaats Daraa en zag geen andere uitweg dan te vertrekken. „De bombardementen kwamen steeds dichterbij, voor mijn ogen zag ik het gebeuren. De kans op overleven werd kleiner.”

Later

Aifalin vluchtte weg met haar twee kinderen. Hassan kwam ze later achterna. De reis vanuit Syrië, waarvoor zij 2.000 dollar betaalde, was allesbehalve comfortabel. Na acht dagen met een boot op zee ging de motor stuk. „We werden als schapen uit de boot gehaald”, vertelt oudste dochter Fatima. Met een andere boot reisde het gezin verder, om uiteindelijk via allerlei tussenstops in Nederland aan te komen.

Na een jaar in een asielzoekerscentrum in Almelo te hebben gewoond, hebben Hassan en Aifalin nu een eigen huisje in Wierden. Ze zijn blij met de kansen die ze hier krijgen. Via de Voorleesexpress van de bibliotheek kwam Paulien Ho-



▲ Het Syrische gezin Talib is blij met de hulp van Paulien Hogenkamp en haar gezin. FOTO ANNA ROMTA

genkamp in contact met het Syrische gezin. „Ik ging naar ze toe om de kinderen te helpen met hun Nederlandse woordenschat. Ik kreeg al snel bewondering voor hun manier van leven en voor de kracht die zij hebben”, zegt Hogenkamp.

Er ontstond een bijzondere vriendschap. „Ik wil het gezin helpen. Het is niet voor te stellen dat je meemaakt wat zij meegemaakt hebben. Ik word al verdrietig als ik eraan denk: acht dagen op de boot met kleine kinderen en vluchten naar een land waar je niemand kent. Zij verdienen het dat ze zich hier welkom voelen.”

Contact

Vier dagen in de week krijgen Hassan en Aifalin Nederlandse les, in de hoop te slagen voor de inburgeringscursus en in Wierden te mo-

gen blijven wonen. Paulien heeft geregeld dat Aifalin vrijwilligerswerk mag doen bij de wereldwinkel in Wierden. „De basis van een bestaan in Nederland is het spreken en het verstaan van de taal. Door veel met mensen om te gaan, oefent Aifalin met de Nederlandse taal en komt zij in contact met anderen.”

Coba Rozema, vrijwilligerscoördinator van de Wereldwinkel, deelt de mening van Paulien en vindt dat

Vluchten naar een vreemd land. Ze verdienen het om zich welkom te voelen

—Paulien Hogenkamp

de Wereldwinkel geschikt is voor mensen om in contact te komen met anderen. „Mensen die naar de Wereldwinkel gaan, komen vaak niet alleen om even rond te snuffelen en hebben meestal wel tijd voor een praatje met de vrijwilligers.”

Vrijwilligerswerk

Hassan verricht ook vrijwilligerswerk. Op basisschool de Widerode, waar de kinderen van Paulien en haar man Bennie naartoe gaan, helpt hij met allerlei klusjes. Van verven tot het repareren van stoelen en het ordenen van de laptops. En elke woensdagmiddag helpt hij samen met de buurman op de basisschool. Het is heel wat anders dan zijn baan als taxichauffeur in de Syrische hoofdstad Damascus. Henk Bekkema van de Widerode is blij met Hassan. Hij

verricht klusjes die anders vergeten worden. Het Syrische gezin doet er alles aan om zich aan te passen. „Ik stel me vaak voor als Evelien, lekker Nederlands”, zegt Aifalin. De bijnaam van Hassan is ‘Johnny’. Het gezin heeft Sinterklaas gevierd en de kerststal heeft een speciale plaats in het huis gekregen. Gezelligheid en eten staan centraal bij de familie Talib. „Als mensen bij ons komen, gaan ze niet de deur uit zonder mee te eten.”

De vlucht vanuit Syrië heeft op de kinderen een grote indruk gemaakt. Fatima wil later een boek schrijven over haar leven. En Louai wil ‘vliegtuigchauffeur’ oftewel piloot worden. Hij wil ervoor zorgen dat iedereen met het vliegtuig naar een ander land kan en niet meer met de boot hoeft.

“Admiration for the strength of the family that fled Syria” in *De Twentsche Courant Tubantia*, 21 January 2017

Immigrants and refugees are two legally distinct groups that have differing political needs — however, they are not always treated as such. In this context, the Dutch media increasingly distinguishes between seemingly ‘desirable’ immigrants (such as students and highly-skilled immigrants, often categorized under the ‘expat’ label) and less desirable immigrants, namely those less educated and less wealthy.



Although both groups are technically immigrants, they are conceptualized in different terms by the public discourse. The immigrants that are less desirable are hereby conflated with asylum seekers. As Eberl et al. (2018) posit: even prior to the migration caused by the Arab Spring, “the most salient group of immigrants in news coverage tends to be asylum seekers”. Portrayals of individuals and communities and the characteristics prescribed to them by the media discourse is subsequently shaped by a sense of how ‘other’

the incoming individual and group is, with a higher level of perceived otherness evoking a more hostile response. As such, discourse in The Netherlands and Western Europe has begun to increasingly conflate the notions of immigrant and refugee, leading to both groups being considered in the same terms despite often having very different reasons for entering the country.



Geert Wilders posting on Twitter “Never bow to Islam”, with a photo of convicted American criminal Charles Manson as Prophet Muhammad

Changing economic and political realities have transformed The Netherlands, once seen as a multicultural dream, into a country that increasingly conceives of immigration and Muslims in particular as a political problem that must be addressed and managed rather than as positive constituents of a changing Dutch identity. The increasingly negative perceptions of immigrants and the purported implications of increasing immigration are reflected and simultaneously reinforced by public media outlets.



Conclusion

Portrayals of immigrants and refugees in The Netherlands are multifaceted and reflect the country's varying political orientations. Media framings have been of key relevance in the social construction of the immigrant and refugee 'other' as an entity that more often than not is conceptualized in rather negative terms: sometimes as a threat to Dutch prosperity, sometimes to Dutch liberalism and sometimes to an abstract notion of Dutch culture more generally.



That said, it would be oversimplistic to suggest that The Netherlands have outright rejected immigration throughout its history as much of post-war Dutch history is pivotally connected to the efforts of individuals that are neither white nor Christian nor born in the country. In lieu of this, Islamic migrants in particular face increasing hostility in The Netherlands, a trend that is partly constructed and reaffirmed by media portrayals.



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Problem and goal



What sort of a problem does the activity solve or address?

Modern information technologies have enabled the global and ubiquitous access to new sources of information and new variations of media consumption. Whilst this has produced extreme benefits for publicly accessible political literacy, these new technologies and connected social media platforms have also allowed terrorist groups to disseminate their messages globally at a higher and less geographically restrained pace. As such, media consumption and information technology has emerged as key factors shaping the radicalization of young individuals through-

out Europe, especially those of migrant and refugee backgrounds. Often experiencing social and economic marginalization in their daily lives, migrants and refugees in particular are at a high risk of undergoing online radicalization.

At-risk youth are often integrated into youth organizations and/or groups focused on deradicalization and/or radicalization prevention, most of which imply the inclusion of youth workers. The growing impact of online radicalization hereby does not just impact those at risk of radicalization but also those responsible for detecting and addressing radicalization. For this reason, youth workers constitute the target group of this activity.

What do we reach, what is the aim?

The training aims to raise awareness regarding the issue of online radicalization and the differing dimensions of online radicalization for youth workers involved in addressing and detecting online radicalization. As such, the training seeks to improve the understanding of how online radi-

calization plays out, especially in connection to the often stigmatized and negative portrayals of young migrants/refugees. Following the training, participants will have gained a better understanding of what online radicalization is, how it plays out, how it can be detected, and, ideally, how they can help to prevent it.



Time Allowance

The training will include five different activities, the content of which is described in *Activity description*. The five activities laid out below will require the following approximate amount of time.

Sculpturing of perceptions

30 minutes

Immigration/asylum/ radicalization walk

15-20 minutes for walk,

45-60 minutes for discussion

Reflection workshop

5-10 minutes per discussion round,
around 20 minutes for the final discussion
and the gathering of results

Radicalization pyramid

approx. 10 minutes for laying out the content
of the exercise, 50 minutes for group work

A migrant's path

90 minutes (15 minutes for preparation,
45 minutes for group work, 30 minutes
for debriefing)

Demanding time for the preparation
of the activity shall be stated.

Sculpture

5-10 minutes to clear up space in the room

Immigration/asylum/ radicalization walk

10-15 minutes to clear up space

and mark steps on the floor

Reflection workshop

5-10 minutes to move tables and chairs
and provide tables with paper and pens

Radicalization pyramid

5-10 minutes for erecting the flip charts
and sorting out tables and chairs

A migrant's path

15-20 minutes to free up space, write the
obstacle cards and prepare the corners
so the groups can start



Aid

Aid, technology, tools and subjects needed for the activity.



Immigration/asylum/ radicalization walk

A band of tape that can be attached to the floor and removed easily once the activity is finished.
A set of predetermined questions will be required.

Reflection workshop

Enough tables for 5-6 to be seated per paired table as well as enough chairs for everyone to sit.
Paper and pens for the hosts will be needed too.

Sculpture

None

Radicalization pyramid

Enough tables for 3-5 to be seated per paired table as well as enough chairs for everyone to sit.
A4 papers, pens, flipcharts and markers (number depending on the group size). Pre-printed pyramid samples, with the number depending on the size of the group.

A migrant's path

Tape to demarcate checkpoints and start and finish points. Prepared obstacle cards with obstacles faced by migrants/refugees (these can be adapted in terms of content).



Further equipment needed shall be stated

(internet, space, room adjustments etc.)

- The room that is being used by the partner might have to be adjusted in size, depending on the local social distancing regulations connected to Covid-19 and the number of participants.
- The room must be big enough for all participants to move in, if necessary, in accordance with local Covid-19 regulations.
- As discussed above, the room structure must be adjusted according to the requirements of the exercise.



Activity description

Brief activity description and methodology (methodology can be described from the position of the trainer as well as members of the group).

Sculpturing of perceptions

This involves participants to act in pairs with a technically unlimited number of participants. In pairs, participants receive an instruction from the instructor (one single person is sufficient here) to sculpt their partner in some way (i.e. 'position you partner in a way that makes him/her look proud') within one minute.

The instructions are adapted to the context (i.e. 'position your partner in the way the media in your country portrays migrants/refugees', 'position your partner in the way you think migrants want to be perceived', etc.). The party that is being sculpted and the sculptor change after every round. After every round, the instructor asks others as well as the sculptor to reflect on their sculpting. This activity provides the participants with a means of visualization and corresponds with the topics discussed, thus encouraging reflection on their own conditions and how others may be at a disadvantage. At the same time, work is done in an accessible and interpersonal way and should, ideally, incentivize communication and teamwork.

Immigration/asylum/ radicalization walk

This involves a number of participants to be placed next to each other at a baseline created with a line of tape on the floor. Besides this, there will be a number of lines of tape both behind the participants and in front of the participants, depending on the space available. The tape lines should be placed sufficiently far removed from one another to make it apparent who is at what line. To start the exercise, the instructor reads out a question. If the participant answers that question with 'yes', he or she moves forward to the next line of tape in front of her/him. If the answer is 'no', he or she moves backwards to the next line of tape behind her/him. It is best to start with some fairly general questions (i.e. 'I have been born in the country I live in') before moving on to more topic-specific questions (i.e. 'Never have I been discriminated online against because of my skin color', 'Never have I been discriminated online against because of my religion', etc.). The questions are very flexible here and can be adapted according to the specific educational context the game takes place in.



In the end, the questions should be structured in such a way that indicates that migrants/refugees are at a severe disadvantage in how and why they experience discrimination, especially online. Following the game-phase (15-20 minutes), 45-60 minutes should be allocated to discuss the participants' impressions of the outcome. This game helps to raise awareness, incentivize empathy and illustrate that the lived experiences of individuals often differ tremendously.



Reflection workshop

This method enables participants to conduct a thorough assessment of the issues connected to (online) discrimination of migrants and refugees whilst aiming to develop implementable solutions. The topics are addressed in a round-based system that uses interactive discussions on core matters. Participants are placed on tables with up to five other people, with one person per table working as the main host. Following each question round (questions could be, for example, 'where does online radicalization stem from?', 'what could be a way of preventing online radicalization?'), the table host summarizes what

has been suggested in the group. Following each round, the participants then move around to different tables with different hosts, where they initially share their experience and ideas discussed at their previous table. They then listen to the host at the new table before receiving the new question and discussing new aspects. Towards the end of the game, everyone will have visited several different tables, allowing for knowledge transfer and communication between stakeholders. In the discussion round the tables may propose a list of ideas, priorities or actions relating to preventing online radicalization.



Radicalization pyramid

The pyramid is initially drawn onto a flipchart stage by stage by the host of the exercise. Each stage includes an incident (starting with the base and moving to the top) that can incentivize increasingly radicalizing behavior and a dimension

of radicalized behavior (such as social isolation from individuals that do not belong to the own community). The further one gets to the top of the pyramid the more extreme the incidents and the more life-threatening the behavior becomes,

ultimately resulting in radicalized harm to self and/or others. This exercise indicates that radicalization is a gradual process in which forms of escalation are based on previous experiences and stages of radicalization. After the concept of the pyramid has been introduced, the general group is split up into smaller groups (3-5 people) that are given a sample of the pyramid along with A4 papers, pens, flipchart and markers. Give them the task to elaborate on each stage of the pyramid and provide concrete examples, what can be done to prevent these developments and to prevent further radicalization and what could be the best possible role of young people.



A migrant's path

Explain the nature and purpose of a simulation game. The group will be split into different groups (3-5 people), all of which will have to face different situations faced by migrants and refugees that arrive in a new country and struggle to adapt whilst being faced with the dangers of radicalization. The room is split into as many corners as there are teams: for each group, demarcate a starting point, three checkpoints and a finishing line (to mark the start and the end of the journey, as well as three obstacles they will face). Each group receives a different scenario in which they operate as a family that has to make deci-

Afterwards, hold a debriefing session in which the following caveats are discussed

- Do you get a better understanding of the radicalization process and its elements?
- In which stages do you believe that young people and/or youth workers can interfere?
- Have you realized before how the small actions (or lack thereof) can lead to bigger consequences?
- What are the most common elements that can lead to violent extremism?
- What did you take away from this exercise?

sions as a group. The game highlights the need for respect, empathy and sharing. The groups receive ten minutes to reflect on the respective situations they are in and discuss the questions that have been given to them. After they discuss their scenario, give them the first task: for five minutes, to decide as a group which three out of ten things to take to get on their journey.

After they finish with the first task, they “start” their journey. They then pick three obstacle cards, which are the cards with different challenges that refugees can face on their journey and after arriving in their country of destination.



For 10-15 minutes, the groups can discuss the challenges and seek to find a solution to them. They can pass through the checkpoint after each obstacle-card decision is finished, moving them closer to the finish.

After each group is done, leave some time for group elaboration and feedback before forming a plenary discussion round.



The plenary discussion should address the following questions

- How did you feel when you had to choose three things to pack?
- Was it easy for you to make group decisions?
- What do you think about the obstacles of migrants/refugees and how do they make you feel?
- How do you feel about the people that need to go through such a journey?

Practical remarks from implementation in practice:

Likely difficulties, variability, adaptation towards environment, age, etc.



Some activities require some movement and might thus not be accessible for people that are impaired in their physical mobility. Some exercises also require reading and writing skills. Another difficulty may be that all exercises require participants to empathize with something they have perhaps not personally experienced. The exercises are adaptable depending on their environment, especially as their structure can be modified to suit the respective educational purpose.

A culmination of the hard course in the area of foreigners occurred when the controversial former immigration minister Inger Støjberg was charged in a historic impeachment trial who spearheaded dozens of tough immigration who was accused of unlawfully ordering the separation of young asylum-seeking couples in 2016. Same minister who not only in Denmark but worldwide got famous for celebrating the achievement of the adoption of new strict laws by posting a photograph of a celebration cake to social media after her 50th amendment to tighten immigration controls was ratified earlier this week back in 2017.

via nyheder.tv2.dk



On 13 December 2021, the Supreme Court ruled in the case against former Immigrants and Minister of Integration, Inger Støjberg. Inger Støjberg was convicted of intentional violation of Ministerial Accountability Act § 5, paragraph 1 and received a sentence of 60 days unconditional imprisonment in The child custody case. This is only the sixth time in Danish history since the constitution was adopted in 1849, that a minister has been in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's ruling by Inger Støjberg is of a principled nature, and it has aroused great debate and disagreement. about whether Inger Støjberg should be found guilty or innocent, and what signifi-

cance the outcome of the trial would get for her political career in the short and long term.

The case of Inger Støjberg and the story of the separated asylum couples has filled the media picture for several years, but also among politicians and population groups it has filled a lot. What is interesting in this context is that no politician or officials was talking about the offense before Marianne Fajstrup in Berlinske on 25 January 2016, for the first time brought the story in the medias. This was despite the fact the numbers of officials warned the former minister about the potential offense, no one confronted the danish parliament.



Since the media brought the story in 2016 there was a huge interest about the story in the medias and among the danish people. A more and more devoted population start discussing the case on emotional and brutal way on social medias. A Facebook group “the danes support Inger Støjberg” was created and on the other side a group of people created a Facebook group with hundreds of thousands of members against Inger Støjberg.



Rather you like it or not, you cannot ignore the fact that topics about refugees in medias plays a big role in the danish society and is both one of the most discussed topics among the Danes and gives most intense discussion on social medias.



Thank you for the offer of prayer call, but no thank you

via kristeligt-dagblad.dk


Member of the government party in the danish parliament Lars Aslam Rasmussen who was invited during our K2 project to give a speech, here during an interview where he share his skeptical opinion about the Islamization of young people in Denmark today and his opposition to the idea of a prayer call in Copenhagen.



Immigrant boys must not make it unsafe to take S-trains

via [berlingske.dk](https://www.berlingske.dk)

In august 2020 the danish prime minster presented a new police policy agreement with the goal making Danes safer and more comfortable using public transportation.



The agreement is about to it safer using public transportation in Greater Copenhagen. You should not be afraid to go home in the evening, because there are 15-17 immigrant boys who cannot figure out how to behave properly, says Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. Several politicians from the danish parliament addressed the problem of the way the danish prime minister describing migrants' boys.

Parliament member Sikander Siddique reacted by saying that Mette Frederiksen breathes xenophobia they way she describe migrant boys. Few days was complaining about migrants boys approach to COVID-19.



When she first suspects minorities who are infected with a deadly disease, and today longs for what she calls immigrant boys she breathes xenophobia. When the country's prime minister three days in a row makes two statements about

migrant boys that are difficult not to see as racist, it paints a very problematic picture of a head of government who divides Denmark instead of uniting, he says.

Based on the statements from the danish prime minister and opinions of Sikander Siddique, Copenhagen Youth Network arranged several activists in context to the statements to test the impact on youth with migrant background from Ballerup and Copenhagen.

- We arranged an EVENT in Energicenter Kobbelvænget. Here we invited a group of youth with migrant backgrounds from Technical University of Denmark (Department Ballerup), youth from the football club Mladost IF from Ballerup, some with and some without migrant background.
- We also invited the association "Kurdish women association" to join the debate. And organization with Kurdish, Arabic and Minorities. Copenhagen Youth Network were moderators of the debate panel.
- We also made a survey among 40 youth with migrant backgrounds between 15 – 25 from Ballerup to test how the statement from the prime minister effected them.



B.T and Ekstra Bladet — two most well-known digital medias

Every day, Ekstra Bladet is in contact with close to a million users who follow breaking news in Denmark and the world. Around 100 million times a month people are visiting the website ekstrabladet.dk close to DKK 100 million. Ekstra Bladet are also active on Facebook and with a daily physical newspaper. While Ekstra Bladet in July 2020 had 465 millions online views BT had

465 million (on the third place TV2 140 million views). It shows how big and essential role both medias who remind a lot about it each other have on the danish population. Research during the last two years among 400 youth in Copenhagen, Odense and Ballerup shows that their popularity is indisputable among the Youth.





Both medias are like other big digital medias such as Politiken, Jyllands Posten and Berlingske very active in the covering of refugees in the medias. They are daily sharing bad stories that create intense debates in the society. An analyze from Infomedia, the Nordic regions leading media intelligence powerhouse shows that despite the many negative covering stories of refugees and migrants in the Danish medias the Danish reputation has not been slightly harmed globally.
via infomedia.dk



During 2020 and 2021 CYN has conducted studies among youth with migrant, refugees but also with ethical Danish background. Based on the analyzes the youth experiences is that the medias play the biggest role on the negative image of refugees and migrants in the society. Despite the fact that the descendants of immigrants storming forward in higher education, many of these young students feels associated with bad integration, crime and religious fanaticism.
via berlingske.dk

As example several youth mention that medias are interesting in portraying young criminals or radicalized youth with other migrant/refugees' background instead for portraying the youth who are well integrated and well educated.



Michal Dyrby: We have to force young migrants to get vaccinated

In 2021 BT made a portrait of Michal Dyrby, Editor-in-chief of BT with the headline refugees should leave Denmark whenever possible.


via [bt.dk](https://www.bt.dk)

Same Michal Dyrby has criticized young males with migrant background in a debate post due to the targets affiliation to the vaccine against COVID-19. In the post Michal Dyrby supports the idea of forcing these males to get vaccinated or in worst case get paid to get vaccinated.

via [bt.dk](https://www.bt.dk)

The refugee debate on social media is “emotional, confrontational and only serves to dig ditches.” This is the opinion of just over half of the Danes who in a survey conducted by Analyze Danmark declare “completely agree” or “partially agree” with the above.

It gets emotional and people with negative or extreme attitudes jump to the keys the fastest. Those who have something to complain about, they write. Those who do not have are quiet, says Mads Kæmgaard Eberholst, senior lecturer at the Center for Power, Media and Communication at RUC to Ugebrevet A4.



Descendants of immigrants are storming forward in higher education

via berlingske.dk

Children of immigrants are doing well according to the Danish Knowledge Center for Integration.

In higher education, the descendants take up even more space than they do in the general population, analysis from the knowledge center shows.



Afghan refugees are doing quite well in Denmark

via nb-kommune.dk

Several mayors declare themselves ready to receive refugees from Afghanistan. New inventory shows that the Afghan refugees are doing quite well in this country.





More non-Western entrepreneurs are good news

via lederne.dk

Danes with a non-Western background have really gained the courage to be independent. This applies to both immigrants and their descendants. Descendants in particular are storming forward when it comes to starting your own business.

This is shown by the latest figures for the period 2014–2017 from Statistics Denmark. Over the four years, the number of new businesses established by non-Western immigrants has increased by 21 percent. Among descendants, the number of newly established companies has increased by just over 46 percent. In comparison, the number of ethnic Danish entrepreneurs has only grown by just over four percent.



Immigrant girls overtake Danish young people as pattern breakers

via kristeligt-dagblad.dk

While the proportion of pattern breakers is falling or stagnating among young people with a Danish background, significantly more young immigrants and descendants from unskilled families are taking an education.



Three out of four young women with a non-Western immigrant background become pattern breakers, while this applies to two out of three women from unskilled ethnic Danish homes, and just over half of young men with a Danish and immigrant background.

It shows a new analysis from the Labor Movement's Business Council, which has mapped parenting background and educational choices among 68,600 25-year-olds, of which 6,300 are immigrants and descendants.

France Info appeals to the left-wing viewers & listeners

via francetvinfo.fr



*Dismantling of the Loon plage camp,
near Grande-Synthe (North),
on 16 November 2021*

Migrants: “This year 2021 is terrible, there are deaths at all borders”, deplors the president of France *Fraternités*.

However, Pierre Henry sees signs of hope in Europe, especially in Germany where the new coalition is on a path of “crisis prevention”.

The political position is mainly on the left with a strong affiliation to France insoumise (28.6% for non-subscribers and 35.2% for subscribers) and the extreme left

via lemonde.fr

●●●

**Between “firmness” and “humanity”,
Emmanuel Macron’s ridge line on immigration**


*The migration policy of the head of state, embodied
by the Collomb law, has not marked a clean break
with that of his predecessors at the Elysée*



The annual immigration figures, published on Thursday 20 January 2022, by the Ministry of the Interior and supposed to reflect the content of the policy in force, reveal above all the impact of the health crisis in 2021 on the administration and population movements. Flows, which had fallen in 2020, are almost back to their 2019 level. Some 272 000 first residence permits were issued and while asylum applications are on the rise again, removals are still struggling.

Almost one in two immigrants in France was born in Africa, one in three in Europe

Share of the total population by city catchment area, in 2018, in %






Share of the immigrant population in the total population by catchment area of cities with more Than 5,000 inhabitants, by country of birth, in 2018, in %

Than 5,000 inhabitants, by country of birth, in 2018, in %

Countries from Maghreb

Countries from Africa
(Except Maghreb)

Countries from Europe
(including Russia)




Source : Insee
Infographie *Le Monde*

France Culture is the French national cultural radio station of the Radio France group

via franceculture.fr

On Wednesday, 27 migrants died in the sinking of the dinghy on which they were hoping to reach the United Kingdom from the Pas-de-Calais. The British press blamed France for this tragedy, accusing it of passivity, or even complicity with the smugglers.



What does the British press have to say in the wake of the shipwreck on the English Channel that cost the lives of 27 migrants?

The event is making the headlines on the other side of the Channel: “human tragedy” for The Daily Mirror, “horror on the Channel” for The I Paper, a “disaster” according to The Telegraph... in short, a “disgraceful” tragedy, to use the word that runs across the front page of The Sun.

British lifeguards bringing migrants and their boat ashore at Dungeness, 24/11/21

For beyond the headline, there are several elements in the editorial choices made by the tabloid that sum up the position of the British press. First, the headline, in the form of an indignation, a question: “And now, will our leaders finally act? We are not immediately told which leaders are involved, nor in what direction they are being asked to act... but it becomes clearer with the choice of the main photo: it was taken on a French beach, and we see people wearing life jackets pulling an inflatable boat towards the sea; a man, without a jacket, seems to be urging them to go faster, because behind them there is a car with a blue flashing light, a 4x4 pick-up truck that is presented in the caption as a French police vehicle, idly watching the departure of a group of migrants similar to the one that sank a few hours later.



The tone is set: “French police lazily watch as boats leave for the UK”, accuses The Sun, joined by the (usually more moderate) Daily Mirror, which uses the same image of “police looking the other way as children are loaded onto makeshift rafts”. The Mirror points out that the photo was taken on a beach at Wimereux in the Pas-de-Calais, and that it was not the same group of migrants who were shipwrecked afterwards, but it was a matter of time.



Neutrality of information processing

MIGRANTS “Voluntary return” consists of offering a flight and a sum of money to encourage an undocumented migrant to return to his or her country of origin. The head of the French Office for Immigration and Integration (Ofii), Didier Leschi, is defending his “balance sheet”. At a hearing before the National Assembly’s law commission prior to a parliamentary vote on his nomination for a new mandate at the head of the Ofii, he explained that 5,000 people had opted for a “voluntary return”.

A procedure which consists, for the State, in offering a flight and a sum of money (at least 1,850 euros) to encourage an irregular migrant to leave France and return to his or her country of origin. The health crisis has reduced “voluntary returns. “We are in a very difficult period from the point of view of deportations (to the border) because of the health crisis,” Didier Leschi stressed. “For voluntary departures, we were up to 8,000 in 2019, but the halt in air transport, the health difficulties, have brought us down to around 5,000 departures in 2021,” compared to around 4,500 in 2020, Didier Leschi explained.


“It will be one of the challenges (of the next mandate) to resume a very proactive action for voluntary departures, some of which will then benefit from reintegration assistance” in the country of origin, he continued. “It seems important to me to ensure that people, once they no longer have a residence permit, return to their country of origin in the best possible conditions and to stabilise them by enabling them to develop an economic activity,” added the director general of the Ofii.



In 2020, expulsions of illegal immigrants fell by half (51.8%), with 9,111 “forced removals”, compared with 18,906 the previous year



Immigration: France to ‘voluntarily return’ 5,000 foreigners in 2021





The political position is mainly on the left with a strong affiliation to France insoumise (28.6% for non-subscribers and 35.2% for subscribers) and the extreme left via monde-diplomatique.fr

Several associations keep an up-to-date list of the victims of “Fortress Europe”, both immigrants and refugees. Based on press reports and reports from local organisations, they try to establish as accurate a count as possible. Only precisely documented deaths - more than 7,000 between 1993 and 2006, or 3,000 in the period from December 2003 to 2006 alone - are therefore included in these maps, which are minimal representations of an ignored hecatomb.

Immigration, wave or tsunami?

via marianne.net

After having addressed the debt, secularism and ecology, “Marianne” publishes “Immigration, wave or tsunami?”, the fourth special issue of the collection “Ces débats que les politiques devraient avoir”.

Because the subject is as passionate as it gets, Marianne wanted to open the debate on immigration. Without preconceived ideas, without bias. By analysing the migration phenomenon in a historical context and a global framework, because the history of humanity, since Homo erectus and Homo sapiens, is intertwined with that of migrations. There are several explanations for migratory movements.

The desire of human groups to seek a better world elsewhere, to flee misery and persecution. Desire for conquest and discovery of unknown lands. The desire for power, the thirst to dominate and accumulate wealth. From Rome to the colonisations of the Europeans, via the Arab, Ottoman and other empires, our history is a long succession of population movements, voluntary or involuntary.



France is a special case

By its history, its demography, its position as a crossroads in Western Europe. For centuries, it experienced very few migratory movements in either direction.


Unlike all other countries, especially in Europe. Since the middle of the 19th century, with the demographic collapse and the industrial revolution, it has become a land of immigration.

Several Challenges journalists feel and deplore the fact that their newspaper “rolls for Macron”

via challenges.fr

Immigration “good for the economy” according to the Council for Economic Analysis. According to the body that advises the government, the long-term issues, not just the short-term costs of immigration, should be considered.

Firstly, “a considerable body of economic research demonstrates the benefits of skilled and diverse labour immigration” in terms of innovation, entrepreneurship and therefore growth and productivity, the note points out.



Citing observations made in the United States, a country at the forefront of attracting foreign talent, its authors show that immigrants, who represent 13% of the population, were behind 24% of patents filed between 1940 and 2000, and that they represent 26% of entrepreneurs.



In France, only 8% of patents are filed by immigrants, who represent about 10% of the population

Vicious circle

Furthermore, studies show that the diversity of birthplaces of a company's employees is a source of greater productivity, and that the network effects of diasporas create "bridges" with other countries that stimulate foreign trade and investment.

With 37.8% of working-age immigrants having an educational level equal to or lower than the brevet and 70% of immigrants (excluding European mobility) coming from the African continent, "our country is not exploiting these opportunities", summarises Emmanuelle Auriol.

"France is in a vicious circle where, as immigration is not very diversified and not very qualified, public opinion is rather unfavourable. And this leads to very restrictive policies" in terms of economic immigration, adds Hillel Rapoport.

The note therefore recommends "rethinking national migration policy" by developing "varied" immigration channels in terms of geographical origin.

To do this, its authors recommend the creation of a points-based visa system, based on the model of those existing in Canada and Australia, which has the merit of being "transparent, fair and efficient", but also "flexible" in terms of the criteria used to determine the profile of immigration candidates.

They would also like to strengthen the "talent passport" scheme, created in 2016 to encourage the reception of qualified young people. In 2019, only 13,500 passports were issued via this scheme, which "does not allow the trend of low-skilled, undiversified and low-volume immigration to be reversed".

Other recommendations aim to improve the quality of education in order to attract more students and to facilitate the granting of residence permits to students at the end of their course, by relaxing the eligibility criteria, as only 21% of foreign students are still present in France five years after their arrival in the country.



Appeal to left-wing readers, especially the generation of sixty-eighters

67% of French people are worried about a “great replacement”

via france24.com

The theory of the Great Replacement has made its way around the world, becoming very popular among identity movements in Europe and within the “alt-right”, the American alternative right. For Aurélien Mondon, this has been made possible by the way the far right has adapted its position on racism. Rather than talking about racial or ethnic hierarchies, the discourse focuses more on cultures and cultural power.

In a recent interview with the right-wing television channel CNews, Renaud Camus said that his theory was not about race, but about the defence of civilisation. “Racism is still taboo in our societies,” says Aurélien Mondon. “No one wants to admit they are racist and no one wants to be called racist.”

“People who watch this interview and will succumb to this panic, this idea that they are going to be replaced ethnographically, don’t want to be called racist and will say they are defending civilisation,” he continues. “This approach offers them respectability while at the same time conveying racist prejudices, and protecting their own privileges,” analyses the lecturer.

French institute of public opinion

via ifop.com

Five segments can be distinguished within the French population. All of them reflect distinct opinions and attitudes towards the issues of immigration, refugees, identity, Islam and the economic situation. and the economic situation.

At the extremes are the Multiculturalists, who have a positive – or rather less negative – attitude to the issues of immigration, refugees, identity, Islam and the economic situation. attitude towards the future of France and towards




immigrant and refugee populations, and and refugees, and the National Identitarianists who tend to vote for the Front National and are more pessimistic about the economic and cultural situation in France.

Nationalist Identitarians are also opposed to globalisation and a more open society, and have negative attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. Between these two groups lie three other segments: the Humanitarians, the Left Behind, and the Economically Concerned.

Presentation of the segments

(in % of the total population)



Together they define what is known as the **‘anxious middle’** or the **‘ambivalent middle’**


Their views are relatively suggestible and their support for one type of policy or another can change, which is both a risk and an opportunity. This ambivalent milieu represents a total of 53 per cent of the French population.



Immigrants and refugees in Estonia

The number of foreign citizens and persons without citizenship residing in Estonia is around 270,000, which corresponds to a share of 20%. Estonia experienced more deaths than births in 2020 and its population decreased by 2,602 people due to negative natural increase; however, positive net migration helped grow the population as 3,782 people moved to the country, according to Statistics Estonia, the country's official statistics agency. As of 1 January 2021, 1,330,068 people lived in Estonia, according to the agency, and thanks to positive net migration, that is 1,179 more people than the year before.

Largely shielded from immigration pressures due to its geography, Estonia has one of the lowest migrant-apprehension rates in the European Union and received the fewest asylum applications. Nevertheless, public discourse about migrants and foreigners is heavily marked by fear and animosity. Estonia operates one dedicated immigration detention centre, which was opened in 2018 to replace an older facility that had a long track record of riots, hunger strikes, and violence. "Alternatives to detention" are not widely used and the country's laws do not prohibit the detention of children.



via stat.ee



As the cumulative negative natural growth in Estonia is seen during few last decades, the remainder of the population decline since 1990 was caused by emigration. Mainly ethnic Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians emigrated. Consequently, the proportion of these ethnic groups decreased.

The largest ethnic groups in Estonia are Estonians (68.7%), Russians (25.6%), Ukrainians (2.1%), Belarusians (1.2%), and Finns (0.8%). These five groups made up 98.4% of Estonia's population. Migration statistics provide an overview of internal migration, or movement from one administrative unit to another within Estonia, and external migration, or cross-border changes of residence.



The tendency of migration

In 2018, 4 900 new immigrants obtained a residence permit longer than 12 months in Estonia (excluding EU citizens), 22% more than in 2017. This figure comprises 35.1% labour migrants, 34.5% family members (including accompanying family), 25% who came for education reasons and 5.3% other migrants. Around 58 short-term permits were issued to international students and 87 to temporary and seasonal labour migrants (excluding intra-EU migration). In addition, 3 200 intra-EU postings were recorded in 2018, an increase of 5% compared to 2017. These posted workers are generally on short-term contracts.

Ukraine, Russia and Finland were the top three nationalities of newcomers also in 2018. Among

the top 15 countries of origin, Ukraine registered the strongest increase (500) and Latvia the largest decrease (-100) in flows to Estonia compared to the previous year.

In 2019, the number of first asylum applicants increased by 11.1%, to reach around 100. The majority of applicants came from Russia (30) and Turkey (20). The largest increase since 2018 concerned nationals of Russia (+20) and the largest decrease nationals of Pakistan (-10). Of the 90 decisions taken in 2019, 50% were positive.

In early 2020, the government proposed changes to the Alien's Act, Income Tax Act and Taxation Act to prevent the misuse of employment regulations, as well as to limit tax evasion from enterprises and to ensure that they pay foreign work-



ers the required Estonian average monthly wage. Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior proposed changes to the Aliens Act and Study Support and Study Loans Act to regulate the conditions for study migration and family migration in Estonia. This will mostly aim at better meeting the needs of the Estonian labour market. In April 2018, the government adopted a national action plan to prevent and tackle illegal employment.

The Citizenship Act was amended in 2019 to enlarge access to Estonian citizenship. A minor whose parent or grandparent lived in Estonia prior to the restoration of the Republic of Estonia independence (20 August 1991) may now apply for citizenship under a simplified procedure. Another amendment to the Citizenship

Act provides free Estonian language training classes to adult applicants for citizenship who have been legally residing in Estonia for at least five years and are eligible for naturalisation. Language classes can involve paid study leave from work. The language examination does not apply to those who studied in Estonia and applicants aged 65 or older need to pass only the oral language examination.

A new national initiative, called the e-Residency 2.0 White Paper, was launched in December 2018 to continue to expand Estonia's global influence. Based on cooperation between the public and private sector, E-Residency 2.0 includes 49 recommendations to make e-Residency more beneficial for everyone in Estonia.

Official opinions

While Estonia's net migration has been positive for five years in a row, since the majority of immigrants are non-Estonian citizens, as opposed to returning Estonians, this is causing long-term concerns, according to Minister for Population Affairs Riina Solman (right wing Isamaa political party).



via news.err.ee

“At present, there is no overview on the citizenship of immigrants in 2019, but based on 2018, it is projected that most of the net immigration balance consisted not of Estonian citizens but of citizens of other countries,” Solman said to Estonian broadcasting company ERR, reacting to preliminary data from government agency Statistics Estonia which showed a net immigration figure of over 5,000 for 2019.

The Statistics Estonia data recorded 12,240 people arriving in Estonia, and 7,210 leaving the country, in 2019. This figure is provisional and does not include unregistered migration.

Solman also pointed to 2018's figures, saying non-Estonian citizens accounted for over 80 percent of net immigration that year. Over 9,700

people entered Estonia in 2018 who were non-citizens, compared with around 7,800 who held citizenship, Solman said. At the same time, whereas over 6,500 Estonian citizens left the country in 2018, close to 4,000 non-Estonian citizens left.

“To maintain population balance, Estonia has set itself an immigration limit of 0.1 percent of Estonia's permanent

population, or slightly more than 1,300 people per year,” Solman said, noting that the coalition government already has changes on the table to address the issue – as noted net immigration was already around four times that of the 1,300 figure cited by Solman, regardless of the origin of those migrating into the country.

Solman also claimed that temporary residence and short-term employment had risen in Estonia, particularly among Russian and Ukrainian



citizens – these groups had seen around a 25 percent rise on year to 2019 (though “undefined citizenship” makes up the third-largest group at 17 percent-ed.).

Solman, who has made efforts to encourage a growth in Estonia’s birth rate among its citizens, also noted that the relative population of ‘native’ Estonians will also decline, if current trends continue. “According to Statistics Estonia’s population projection last year, the country’s population will decrease slightly, due to a negative natural increase,” Solman said, referring to birth versus death rates among Estonian citizens. “Until more people are born than die, Estonia will not be sustainable,” she added.

“Due to immigration, the proportion of Estonians within the population has been decreasing for several years; this primarily affects the main immigration destinations, especially Tallinn,” she added.

While several preceding ministers of the interior overseeing immigration policy making had aimed both to reassure the relatively immigration-wary public and satisfy the advocacy coalition of employers, EKRE changed track. After becoming minister of the interior, the then chairman of the party Mart Helme likened immigrant labor to slave labor that is endangering Estonia as a nation state, attacked employers using migrant labor and declared that migrant workforce



should be substituted by activating those permanent residents who are inactive in the labor market and bring Estonian labor migrants back from Finland (ERR, 2019).

Two months later he dismissed the immigration regulation working group, a body of public officials of related ministries, stakeholders and experts which had been tasked with proposing ideas for immigration regulation reforms. However, the minister did not attempt to establish an alternative policy monopoly in the form of an alternative working group, and most of Helme's attempts to change immigration legislation were blocked by other cabinet ministers (Internet portal Delfi, 2019; ERR, 2019). Eventually, Helme succeeded in making some amendments to migration regulation, which extended the enforcement regulations of 2018 also to rental labor from companies registered in other EU member states but did not impose any new restrictions.



According to the preliminary data of Statistics Estonia, on January 1, 2020 the Estonian population was 1,328,360, a rise of 3,540 on year. Among those nationalities holding long-term residence permits in Estonia, Russian citizens made up overwhelmingly the highest proportion, with over 80,000, compared with the next-highest group (Ukrainians at a little over 4,000). However, those of “undefined citizenship” numbered over 70,000, according to Statistics Estonia.




Refugees and asylum seekers

Estonian Refugee Council is the biggest NGO which works to help refugees who have arrived to Estonia to start their new lives as quickly as possible, and to provide support also to people forced to flee their homes outside of the Estonian borders.

Since 1997, when the Refugee Act was adopted in Estonia and Estonia acceded to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, a total of about 1,100 asylum applications have been submitted to Estonia (see statistics on the website of the Police and Border Guard Board).

The largest numbers of asylum seekers have come from Ukraine, Syria, Russia, Georgia and Afghanistan





At the time of applying for asylum, people are placed in the accommodation center for asylum seekers in Vao or Vägeva, which are located in Lääne-Virumaa and Jõgeva County, respectively. However, in Estonia a relatively small number of asylum seekers actually receive asylum. In the period 1997–2019, Estonia granted international

protection to 531 people (refugee status to 280 people and subsidiary protection to 251 people). Upon recognition of refugee status, a person is granted a residence permit for three years; in the case of subsidiary protection, a one-year residence permit is issued. The residence permit can be extended for 3 or 2 years, respectively, if the situation in the home country has not improved.

The largest number of beneficiaries during these 20 years have come from



Syria — 192 people
Ukraine — 93
Iraq — 41
Russia — 40

The influence of media

The role of media, and particularly in the Internet, is significant when it comes to shape economic and lifestyle migration. It provides the introduction and helps to create new relationships. A survey taken in 2016 has found that 21% of Estonians considers immigration to be the biggest problem Estonia is facing at the moment, despite the fact that the country that time hasn't received a single asylum seeker from the proposed EU quota. Unemployment was second, chosen by 12% of the respondents.


The Estonian media has not been able to inform the public with enough accuracy on all the

elements involved in the current refugee crisis. At the same time, this informative vacuum has been filled by the social media in the hands of those who have made fear of immigration their main tool for achieving political power. As a result, 21% of Estonians are afraid of something, but they are not sure of, since they do not have any experience with the object of their fear. The images and the news during few months were disturbing. From the massive arrival of desperate people to the central states of Europe, to the inability of many countries to cope with the overwhelming flow of refugees.



At the same time survey conducted in 2016 among the Estonian population and new immigrants were the following:

- The immigrants who have arrived in Estonia in the last six years are mainly people with high educational attainment (although the high percentage could have been a product of the survey format, which was an online questionnaire), and came here mainly due to their work or for family reasons. A very small share has requested and received international protection – only 1% of the immigrants who arrived in the period in question. One part of the immigrants came for various personal reasons, among them are immigrants who came seeking a higher standard of living.
- The predominant share of immigrants works – there are rather few unemployed or non-employed persons.
- The majority of the immigrants came to Estonia from the European Union region, with a fewer share of those from outside the European Union.
- 76% of immigrants sees their future as being tied to Estonia and there are just as many of those who would recommend their acquaintances to come to live in Estonia. Those who have come to Estonia from countries outside the European Union are more likely to wish to settle here permanently.
- Comparing the media space inhabited by Estonian residents and immigrants, we see that they are quite different. 23% of permanent residents follow international media channels at least once a week; 58% of immigrants do so. For the most part, permanent residents follow local news channels. For immigrants, they most often tune into the news from their country of origin.
- Surprisingly, when it comes to migrant crisis topics, immigrants trust nearly all of the information sources more than do the Estonian permanent residents on average. The biggest differences in trust were seen in the case of the Estonian government, ministries/government offices and the foreign media, which are trusted by immigrants by 20% more than by local inhabitants. Friends and acquaintances were considered by both groups to be the most trusted source of information.





Migrants on labour market

Since the quota ceased to meet the demand for labor force around 2016, temporary access to Estonian labor market was simplified by offering immigration counseling to migrants and host institutions and enabling third country nationals to work while holding a visa or being in Estonia based on a visa free regime, provided that they register their short-term employment with the Police and Border Guard Board and that they are paid at least the national average salary (1,404 euros per month in the first quarter of 2020 — Statistics Estonia, 2020).

Since 2018, third country nationals can work in Estonia for up to 1 year in a 1.5-year time frame, when holding a D-visa. The reforms have resulted in a considerable increase of labor immigration, and most notably, of short-term labor mobility.

Registreeritud lühiajalised välistöötajad

Kodakondsus	2019	2020*
Ukraina	24 340	11 663
Valgevene	1 834	980
Venemaa	1 466	758
Moldova	1 145	614
Usbekistan	632	430
Gruusia	418	237
India	330	152
Kasahstan	154	59
Tadžikistan	143	80
Aserbaidžaan	127	67
Brasiilia	127	46
Kõrgõzstan	127	70
Muu	1 419	109
Kokku	32 262	15 758

Allikas: siseministeerium

*11. juuni seisuga



Kes aitaks tööandjaga tülli läinud ukrainlasi? Esile tõstetud

Töötan ühes ehitusfirmas juba poolteist aastat. Kolm kuud tagasi saadeti meid Lõuna-Eesti ehitusobjektile üldehitustöid tegema. Tööandja ütles, et kuna ehitusobjekt on suur ja tähtjad lühikesed, siis võtab tööle ka mõned ukrainlased. Täna läksid ukrainlased tööandjaga tülli – esiteks jagavad nad mitme peale väikest hotellituba, sõidavad iga päev 20+ km tööle ja tagasi ning tööandja on ka nende passid enda kätte hoiule võtnud. Murdepunktiks olevat olnud, et väidetavalt ei ole neile nüüdseks kolm kuud palka makstud. Kuhu peaksid nad abi saamiseks pöörduma?



Väidetavalt ei ole ukrainlastest ehitajad saanud palka kolm kuud.

Foto: pixabay

The COVID crisis did not bring consensus to the governing coalition over migration policy. Although Mart Helme came to the cabinet with ambitious plans for immigration restrictions, the cabinet was reluctant to approve them. While the Centre Party and Isamaa have rather been proponents of conservative migration policy, allowing EKRE to pursue with the reform would have brought political gains to EKRE exclusively, who is perceived as the issue owner by the society. By curbing EKRE's enthusiasm, the other two

coalition partners could also make some political gains vis à vis the employers' and universities' advocacy coalitions EKRE refused to work with. Also, extensive restrictions on migration might have a negative effect on the already ailing economy. The short-term labor migrants have already become a notable group of tax payers and an indispensable labor force (ERR, 2019) for many sectors, e.g., construction or farming, where the labor force demand was not affected by the COVID-19 crisis.

The government agreed to some enhanced regulations on study, family and labor migration, e.g., the obligation of the sponsor (e.g., the employer) to guarantee testing, transportation and a 14-day period of self-isolation of newly arrived immigrants before they can assume work, but also new restrictions on seasonal migration, i.e., a salary requirement for seasonal workers and the reduction of the time limit of seasonal work

from 9 to 6 months per year (daily newspaper Postimees, 2020).


However, there was one additional restriction not communicated by the government which had entered the draft law, namely, a restriction to third country nationals to work in most sectors based on a C-visa or visa-free stay. Thus, EKRE managed to take some additional steps toward restricting short-term labor migration to Estonia.



Autor: Põllumajandus.ee • 3. juuni 2020

RIA.com Marketplaces: Eesti sõltub praegu ukrainlastest rohkem kui kunagi varem

Koroonaviiruse pandeemia tõttu lahkusid Eestist tuhanded võõrtöölised. Ametlike andmete kohaselt oli ainuüksi ukrainlasi Eestis 2020. aasta alguses üle 10 000 ning paljud nendest pöördusid pandeemia puhkemisel Ukrainasse tagasi. See andis tõsise hoobi kogu Eesti majandusele ehitusest põllumajanduseni, märgib RIA.com Marketplaces OÜ oma kommentaaris.



Opposition Social Democratic Party (SDE) leader Indrek Saar wants to grill finance minister Martin Helme (EKRE) on allegations he made last week that Estonia's strawberry farmers may be engaged in tax evasion, in the latest round of a war of words surrounding potential labor shortages as strawberry picking season arrives.

"Last week, the finance minister accused strawberry farmers of potential tax crime, effectively threatening them with repercussions," Saar said Monday, news agency BNS reports. "This is an unforeseen statement in a democratic country," Saar added.

"One cannot but get the impression that the minister is planning a political retaliation for farmers having dared to ask the government for

help in solving the issue of labor shortages. We want to ask Martin Helme in person what is he planning against strawberry farmers, and what instructions he has given to the tax authority," Saar went on.

"Rude and hostile statements concerning farmers from ministers, and speaker of the Riigikogu Henn Polluaas (EKRE), must come to an end," Saar said, according to BNS.

Potential shortage of labor in the strawberry picking sector revolves around the expiry of residence permits for third country nationals, many of them from Ukraine, who would be involved in the harvesting, as a result of changes to the Aliens Act ostensibly sparked by the coronavirus pandemic.



via [reuters.com](https://www.reuters.com)

Conclusion


According to the statistics of Statistics Estonia, as of 1 January 2021, the population of Estonia was 1 329 460, which is 484 persons (0,04%) more compared to the year before. Due to negative natural population decrease (the number of deaths exceeded the number of births), the population decreased by 2590 persons; however, due to the positive migration rate, the population increased by 3074 persons (more people immigrated to than emigrated from Estonia). 2020 was mostly characterised by living in the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a significant impact also on the migration and asylum field.

As of 17th March 2020, the Government decided to temporarily restrict the crossing of the Schengen internal and external border and reintroduce border controls. An emergency situation was declared in Estonia on March 12th to contain the spread of coronavirus, and it lasted until 18th May 2020.

Due to COVID-19 pandemic, Estonia witnessed a decrease in immigration of third country nationals within all migration categories:

- The number of first-time temporary resident permits (TRP) issued by PBGB reduced by 21%, incl. the number of TRP for studying decreased 60%, for family migration 14%, and for employment 6%.
- There was a 31% decrease in registrations of short-term employment compared to the previous year – 22 110 in 2020 compared to 32 245 in 2019. TCN, whose short-term employment was registered in 2020, were most often nationals of Ukraine, Belarus and Russian Federation.
- The number of beneficiaries of international protection decreased by 48% – 26 in 2020 compared to 50 in 2019. Protection was most often granted to citizens of Russian Federation.
- The number of return decisions decreased by 2% - in 2020, 1097 return decisions were made, of which 93% were voluntary return decisions.

In 2020, the development and review process of new national strategies and action plans (“Cohesive Estonia development plan 2030”, “Internal security development plan 2020-2030”) in the field of migration, asylum and integration continued. The new strategies and action plans are expected to be adopted in 2021.




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- Annual Report On Migration And Asylum 2020 via emn.ee



Some relevant publications in Estonia



settle estonia

Settle in Estonia programme

The Settle in Estonia programme is a free educational programme provided by the Estonian state which is intended to help the foreigners who have arrived in Estonia to become accustomed to local life more easily, understand how things are done and adapt more quickly.

The programme consists of eight modules, so that everyone can choose something interesting and useful. The courses are involving and practical.

- Language training module** (a language course at level A1, 80 h)
- Basic module** (essential information for foreigners about the Estonian state and society, 1 day)
- Work and entrepreneurship module** (information for those who have come to Estonia to work or run a business, 1 day)
- Education module** (information on studying in Estonia as well as on the opportunities after finishing the studies, 1 day)
- Family module** (information on family-related matters, 1 day)
- Module for children and teenagers** (a special course for children to take simultaneously with the family module, 1 day)
- Research module** (information for researchers and those interested in science-related topics, 1,5 days)
- International protection module** (only for those who have been granted international protection in Estonia, 3 days)



The programme courses are taught in English or Russian languages in Tallinn, Tartu and Narva. Companies anywhere in Estonia can order courses exclusively for their own employees (with at least 12 people in a group).

Who can take part in the programme?

The programme is designed for the foreigners who came to Estonia to study, work, as a family member or other reasons and have been legally living here for less than 5 years:

- Citizens of the European Union who have been granted a temporary Estonian residence permit and to whom an identity document has been issued;
- members of the families of the citizens of the European Union who have been granted a temporary Estonian residence permit;
- foreign nationals who have been granted a temporary Estonian residence permit under the Aliens Act or the Act on Granting International Protection to Aliens.

Why it is a good idea for expats to participate in the programme?

Participation in the programme is free of charge and will help foreigners to find answers to important questions, make new acquaintances and adapt to Estonian life faster.

90% of all participants of the programme have indicated that their proficiency in the Estonian language, practical knowledge as well as understanding of the Estonian state, society and culture have improved.

The modules provide an overview of all the important topics that any expat who has just settled in Estonia should know.

Study materials are available at www.settleinestonia.ee.

More information and registration at www.settleinestonia.ee

Join us on Facebook: **SettleInEstonia**


Email us at info@settleinestonia.ee



"If you really want to get fully integrated into the system – even if you don't have friends around – when you go to these classes you get to meet new people and make new friends."

Afolake, Nigeria




EMIGRATION AND RETURN MIGRATION OF ESTONIAN CITIZENS

In the period of 2016-2020, the total number of Estonian emigrants (37,251) exceeded the total number of those who returned (36,679). In the period of 2017-2019, the number of those who returned to Estonia was bigger than the number of those who emigrated, but this trend changed again in 2020. So far, the migrants have been men rather than women. In the last year, Estonians mostly went to Finland, Russia, and Great Britain. The number of those who go to Finland has stably remained up to ten times higher than other countries throughout the years. In 2020, too, most people returned to Estonia from Finland, Russia, and Great Britain.

Emigration of Estonians (in 2015-2020)



Source: Statistics Estonia

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview of the main migration trends in Estonia during the period of 2016-2020 and to explain the different aspects of migration.

Estonian population 2017-2021 (as of January 1st)



Source: Statistics Estonia

Where are people going? Emigration of Estonian citizens, 2020


Finland	2212
Russia	276
Great Britain	204
Germany	125
Sweden	108

Where did people return from? Return migration of Estonian citizens, 2020

Finland	2116
Great Britain	437
Russia	322
Germany	127
Norway	126



Return of Estonians (in 2015-2020)



Source: Statistics Estonia

The overview of migration statistics 2016–2020 provides answers to the following questions:

- What characterises the emigration and return of Estonian citizens?
- How many Estonian citizens returned to their homeland?
- To whom, for what purpose, and how many visas were issued?
- How many registrations of short-term employment were there and in what areas?
- Who and for what reasons came to live in Estonia?
- Where did the foreigners settle?
- Who were granted long-term residence permits and the right of permanent residence?
- Who were given international protection?
- Who became Estonian citizens?
- Who became e-residents?
- How many foreigners participated in the Settle in Estonia programme?
- Map of migratory routes



3 WHO CAME TO LIVE IN ESTONIA?

TEMPORARY RESIDENCE PERMIT: a permit issued to a foreigner for settling in Estonia.

- A temporary residence permit may be issued to a foreigner to settle with a spouse or a close relative for the purpose of studying, working, or entrepreneurship, in exceptional cases also for participating

in criminal proceedings, in the case of overriding national interest, or under an international agreement. In addition, a permit for permanently settling in Estonia may be issued to a foreigner who has been living in Estonia for at least three years. A temporary residence permit is valid for up to 5 years and can be extended by up to 10 years.

First-time temporary residence permits, top 5 citizenships (2020)

Ukrainian	1791
Russian	1135
Belarusian	273
Indian	222
Iranian	101
TOTAL	4710

Decisions on the temporary right of residence of EU citizens' family members, top 5 citizenships (2020)

Russian	25
Moldovan	16
Ukrainian	15
Undetermined	7
Brazilian	7
TOTAL	106

Source: Police and Border Guard Board

TEMPORARY RIGHT OF RESIDENCE: Citizens of the European Union will acquire a temporary right of residence for up to 5 years if they register their place of residence in the population register. A temporary right of residence will be automatically extended by 5 years if the place of residence of the EU citizen continues to be registered in Estonia.

The family members of EU citizens who are third country citizens¹ and wish to live in Estonia must apply for a temporary right of residence and for its extension.

An EU citizen and a family member staying with him or her have the right to stay in Estonia on the basis of a valid identity document for up to 3 months without registering or applying for a right of residence.

Project Video



[Tap the link to watch videos](#)



Pavel Smulski,
Mitra France



Lena Odgaard Bjørnsen,
Press adviser
at DRC Danish
Refugee Council



Lars Aslan Rasmussen,
politician from the Danish
parliament representing
the ruling party Social
Demokratiet



Rodion Denissov,
Journalist,
Estonia



Maja Rettrup Mørch,
Chief Consultant Strategy
and Development & Head
of the Representative
Office/Asylum, Red Cross



Moutayam Altaweel,
life story,
the Netherlands



Junaid Qureshi,
Director European Founda-
tion for South Asian
Studies (EFSAS)

Methodological advice

Give clear instructions about times, objectives and expectations of the workshop

- Encourage young people to participate actively
- Engage with young people directly in order to build better communication
- Encourage young people to ask for explanations
- Identify young peoples' questions about the materials of the workshop

Non-formal and informal education methodologies are recommended by the EU Commission as highly successful strategies to engage young people who have previously struggled to participate in classroom and traditional educational contexts. For young people who have been excluded from education, employment and/or training, these strategies could be vital for their successful integration in the learning experience. Therefore, it is recommended that lectures and formal education strategies are balanced with participatory informal and non-formal methodologies. Balancing the above strategies has been shown to improve learn-

ing outcomes in media literacy education. It is recommended that more time be allocated to the non-formal activities over the lectures to ensure continued learner engagement. Non-formal education activities encourage young people to play a more active role in their learning.



Educators are encouraged to make use of the E-Handbook in order to improve the likelihood of learning outcome achievement amongst young people with fewer opportunities. Furthermore, facilitators should make use of evaluation activities to assess the participants' performances and the impact of the workshops. After each workshop, they should reflect on what they did well and what they could have done

better. This will help to consistently enhance their pedagogical ability of facilitator, as well as providing a constantly improving learning experience for participants in media literacy. During the final activities, participants will assess whether they met their expectations and motivations and if they were able to overcome their learning obstacles. They will also decide whether they achieved their learning outcomes.

Also, participants can complete a simple evaluation questionnaire that will assess the content of the E-Handbook. The evaluation form can include the following:

- Do you feel you know more about migration in Europe and its coverage by the media? If not why not?
- Did this workshop meet your expectations and motivations? If not why not?
- How was the teaching style during this workshop? (Rating out of 10)
- What did you like especially about the teaching style during the workshop?
- Is there anything you could recommend to the facilitator in order to improve the learning experience?
- Do you feel more media literate?
- Do you feel like the skills and knowledge you gained today will help you in the real world?
- Is there anything else you would like to mention that you enjoyed especially about the workshop?
- Is there anything else you would have felt would improve your experience of this workshop?



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